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Introduction
i
The Secretary-General of the United Nations recently suggested
that the competent organs of the Organization undertake a thorough
and comprehensive study of the criteria for membership in the U.N.
with a view to laying down limitations on full membership while also
defining other forms of association which would benefit both the Or-
ganization and those states "which have been referred to as 'micro-states',
entities which are especially small in area, population, and human and
economic resources, and which are now emerging as independent
states." 1 Ambassador Arthur J. Goldberg, United States Representative
to the United Nations, in a letter to the President of the Security Council
dated December 13, 1967, joined in the suggestion made by the Secre-
tary-General and expressed the belief that examination of the consider-
ations presented by the Secretary-General is most likely to be fruitful if
it is made in terms of general principles and procedures.' Although no
formal action has been taken by the United Nations, the matter is
understood to be under consideration. The purpose of this report is
to review the principal considerations involved in the suggestion made
by the Secretary-General.
ii
The structure of the world community continues to be characterized
chiefly by the existence of territorially organized units, states, equal in
* This is an abridged version of the report submitted to the Council of the
Section on August 3, 1968.
1 Introduction to the Annual Report of the Secretary-General on the Work
of the Organization, 16 June 1966-15 June 1967, 22 U.N. G.A.O.R., Supp.
No. IA, paras 163-167 (U.N. Doc. A/6701/Add.1) (1967).
2 Department of State Press Release USUN-236 (December 13, 1967), at p. 1.
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sovereign attributes but markedly unequal in effective power, prestige
and influence upon internationally significant events. It is appropriate
to recall the words of J. B. Scott who, writing in 1907 about the Hague
Peace Conferences, stated:
While all states are legally equal, still in this practical world of
ours we must not, or at least we cannot, ignore the historic fact
that nations exercise an influence upon the world's affairs com-
mensurate with their traditions, their industry, their commerce,
and their present ability to safeguard their interests. It follows
from this that though equal in theory, their influence is often
unequal in practice.8
The difference between legal equality and practical inequality is reflected
in the United Nations which, although it is "based on the principle of
sovereign equality of all its Members,"' is a deliberately imperfect
democratic model. It is also reflected, more subtly, in the omission of any
mention of universality of membership in the Charter. The drafters at
San Francisco recognized that universality was an ideal towards which
it was proper to aim.' However, in drafting the Charter they followed
the League of Nations model 6 and deliberately included a set of specific,
if ambiguous, criteria for membership.'
The initial membership of the Organization consisted of only
fifty-one countries. 8 From 1946 to 1959 this number was increased by
thirty-two, all but a few of which were already well established states
and active participants in world affairs. However, the trend has since
changed. All seventeen states admitted in 1960 had just recently at-
tained independence, and the same is true of twenty-three of the twenty-
four admitted since 1960.
The membership now numbers 124, nearly two and one-half times
the number of original members, and the practice of admitting states
3 The Hague Peace Conference of 1899 and 1907 (1907), at 176, cited in
Anand, Sovereign equality of states in the U.N. 7 INDIAN J. INT'L L. 185, 198
(1967).
4 U.N. Charter, Article 2, para. 1.
5 Doc. 1178, 1/2/76(2), 7 U.N. C.I.O. Docs. 326 (1945).
6 See Article 1 of the Covenant of the League.
7The attitudes toward universality at San Francisco are discussed in Green,
Membership in the United Nations, 2 CURRENT LEGAL PROBS. 258 (1949), at
262 ff.; and Cohen, The Concent of Statehood in United Nations Practice, 109
U. PA. L. REV. 1127 (1961), at 1170ff.
g These were the states which had participated in the United Nations Confer-
ence on International Organization, held in San Francisco from April 25 to June
26, 1945, or which had previously signed the Declaration by United Nations of
January 1, 1942, and which had signed and ratified the U.N. Charter.
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soon after they become independent and without strict scrutiny of
their eligibility for membership in accordance with the Charter con-
tinues. Moreover, the process of decolonization has proceeded to the
point where, with a few notable exceptions, the remaining candidates
for self-government, independence and, ultimately, U.N. membership
are extremely small in size, population and/or financial resources. The
number of these "micro-states" or "mini-states" or "Lilliputian states,"
as they have variously been called, is estimated to be over sixty, if one
limits the counting to units with a population of under 300,000, as
has been suggested.' The magnitude of the potential problem becomes
clearer, however, when one contemplates the vast number of island
territories and other small entities which could conceivably seek inde-
pendence, statehood and U.N. membership in the future.
Adding to the problem and making its resolution somewhat more
difficult is the sensitivity of existing states to challenges to their territorial
integrity such as are posed by secessionist, irredentist, and "liberation"
movements of one kind or another. Membership in the U.N. may be
sought as a stamp of legitimacy by any group claiming to represent
an independent "state". This could throw into question the sacrosanctity
of territorial boundaries and lead to fragmentation of existing states.
Hence, the likelihood of a cautious attitude by many U.N. members, in-
cluding the United States.
On the other hand, it is only fair to say that the fear of proliferation
may be exaggerated. Membership in the U.N. is not logically the most
pressing need and may not even be a priority objective for really small
territories. Conceivably, the mini-state problem described by the Secre-
tary-General could work itself out by the simple expedient of encouraging
a lack of interest in membership by small states and potential states.
Accordingly, it seems appropriate to examine, first, why small
states are attracted to U.N. membership and, second, whether all or most
of these attractions could be provided in some other way acceptable to
all concerned.
Attractions of U.N. Membership
Statehood characteristically is accompanied by an intensified
awareness of national interests and a desire to influence events which
have a bearing on those interests. The U.N., as the largest, the most
9 See Blair, The Ministate Dilemma, Occasional Paper No. 6, Carnegie En-
dowment for International Peace (1967), at 3. Mrs. Blair's paper has been a
source of considerable value to the Subcommittee in the preparation of this
Report.
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nearly universal, and the broadest based international institution is
perhaps the obvious point of reference for obtaining such influence.
As a diplomatic center, it offers unparalleled opportunities for contact
with representatives of other countries and of international organizations.
As a public forum, it affords the means for instant communication of
one's message to a wide audience. As the leading international political
institution, its recognition of a state confirms that state's legitimacy and
standing in the world community.
All these factors have contributed to the rush to membership by
newly independent states in the fifties and sixties. Whether they will
have the same impact on mini-states in the seventies and beyond can
only be guessed. Preliminary indications are that to the mini-states of
the future the chief attractions of the U.N. may be its acceptability as a
source of technical and economic assistance and as a countervailing
force for small states whose security is threatened by former metropoles,
neighboring states or other external antagonists.
Full membership is not without its cost. Small member states
may find onerous the drain on their funds (minimum annual dues of
members alone are currently around $50,000) and available trained
manpower. There are also drawbacks to having to meet the demands of
membership and record voting positions on an imposing number and
variety of issues, especially for a small delegation and its home office
which may not be equipped to do so effectively. One can expect these
difficulties to increase and their burden upon future mini-states to be
even heavier than it has been upon small member states to date.
For the U.N., weighing against the desirability of making the
Organization more nearly universal in membership is the prospect of dis-
proportionately increased demands upon the Organization's already
strained physical and economic resources. Even now, it may be pro-
jected that U.N. Headquarters in New York, opened in 1950, will have
to be substantially enlarged to accommodate the increasing size and
workload of the Organization. Moreover, a stream of membership
applications from mini-states could expose the status of full membership
to the risk of debasement, a hazard already discernible to some.
From the standpoint of member states, a substantial increase in
members would dilute voting strength and raise the possibility of vast
shifts in the pattern of voting in the General Assembly, with the mini-
states able by their sheer number, irrespective of the number of people
they actually represent or their effective power measured by conventional
criteria, to heavily influence the outcome to their own advantage.
International Lawyer, Vol. 3, No. 1
62 INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
To the United States, committed as it is to the Organization as
an effective instrument for the maintenance of international peace and
security, the prospect of a deluge of new members with mini-qualifica-
tions but full rights raises serious questions. Enthusiasm for the Orga-
nization would be difficult to sustain if the U.N. of the seventies becomes a
mere caricature of the San Francisco model. The U.N., after all, is
only a means toward the ends enumerated in the Charter, not an end in
itself. There is no reason to suppose that the Organization could long
or effectively operate in defiance of the idea that power and responsibility
ought not to be too distantly separated.
Many feel that steps should be taken to head off continued escala-
tion in the Organization's membership. This raises the question of how
access to and participation in the U.N. can be assured for exceptionally
small states to accommodate their legitimate interests without over-
burdening the Organization or weakening the status of full membership
in it.
Assuring Access and Participation Without
Damaging Organizational Effectiveness
As noted above, the Charter itself does not ensure membership
to all who seek admission. Article 4 (1) of the Charter reads:
Membership in the United Nations is open to all other peace-
loving states which accept the obligations contained in the present
Charter and, in the judgment of the Organization, are able and
willing to carry out these obligations.
As the International Court of Justice (ICJ) had occasion to point out in
its 1948 Advisory Opinion on Conditions of Membership, Article 4 (1)
establishes only five specific requirements for membership: an applicant
must (1) be a state; (2) be peace-loving; (3) accept the obligations of
the Charter; (4) be able to carry out those obligations; and (5) be
willing to do so. These criteria, the ICJ advised, "constitute an exhaus-
tive enumeration" of the requirements for eligibility. 10 It follows that
10 [19481 I.C.J. 57, at 65. In practice, however, other considerations have
been voiced. See extensive citations in GOODRICH & HAMBRO, CHARTER OF THE
UNITED NATIONS 6-9, 112-139 (1949); Liang, Conditions of Admission of a
State to Membership in the United Nations, 43 AM. J. INT'L L. 288 (1949);
Liang, Recognition by the United Nations of the Representation of a Member
State: Criteria and Procedure, 45 AM. J. INT'L L. 689 (1951); Cohen, supra
n. 7, at 1133; and McDougal & Goodman, Chinese Participation in the United
Nations: The Legal Imperatives of a Negotiated Solution, 60 AM. J. INT'L L.
671 (1966), at 684-96.
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without amendment of the Charter the members cannot impose ad-
ditional criteria for membership. This may not rule out a members'
agreement establishing fixed meanings for these enumerated terms.
However, of the five, probably only two-the ones numbered (1) and
(4) above, respectively-would be at all conducive to such an agree-
ment. Even these are apt to prove difficult.
(1) Statehood. Traditionally, the essential characteristics of a
state have been population, territory, self-government, and the capacity
to enter into relations with other states.1' For the purposes of inter-
national law, the last of these qualifications has been regarded as of
particular importance and has served to distinguish states proper from
lesser units which are not recognized by other states as full-fledged
members of the international community. "
These traditional characteristics of statehood could prove difficult
to translate into either Charter language or a members' agreement.
For example, the range in populations of present members stretches
from just over 90,000 to the hundreds of millions. A number of po-
tential candidates for admission to the U.N. have populations in excess
of 90,000 (e.g., Solomon Islands, Western Samoa, Cape Verde Islands,
Channel Islands, Guadeloupe)."8 Nor does there appear to be a logical
cut-off point below 90,000. Hence, a population qualification, by
itself, is not apt to inspire enthusiasm. The same might be said of ter-
ritory. Two existing U.N. members, the Maldives and Malta, consist
of only 298 and 316 square kilometers, respectively. Many prospective
applicants are larger.'"
The traditional non-quantitative characteristics of statehood-
self-government and the capacity to enter into relations with other states
-may prove especially difficult to translate into Charter language or
a members' agreement. The term "self-government," as widely used
in diplomatic parlance, encompasses not only states but also a number
of entities which are not states. The term "capacity to enter into rela-
tions with other states" suffers from being conclusory; i.e., whether
an entity is deemed to have such capacity depends upon a logically
prior determination that it, too, is a state.
(2) Ability to meet Charter obligations. It is worth noting that
under Article 4 (1) of the Charter the Organization has competence to
" See, for example, STARKE, INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 88-89
(5th ed. 1963).
12 Id.
13 See Blair, supra n. 9, Table I.
14 Id.
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determine whether states which meet the other membership criteria also
"are able and willing to carry out [the] obligations [contained in the
Charter]." Willingness to carry out Charter obligations, being highly
subjective, is difficult to measure; in the absence of a history of notorious
behavior, a state's declaration of willingness may fairly well prove its
intent. Ability to carry out Charter obligations, on the other hand,
might be amenable to objective measurement.
Some of the Charter obligations could be carried out without
difficulty by very small states: for example, the obligations to settle
their international disputes by peaceful means [Article 2(3)]; to refrain
from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or politi-
cal independence of any state [Article 2(4)]; to give the United Nations
every assistance in any action it takes in accordance with the Charter
[Article 2(5)]; to refrain from giving assistance to any state against
which the United Nations is taking preventive or enforcement action
[Article 2(5)]; to make available to the Security Council armed forces,
assistance and facilities, including rights of passage, necessary for the
maintenance of peace and security [Article 43(1)]; 15 to cooperate on
the economic and social level [Article 56]; and to comply with the de-
cisions of the I.C.J. [Article 94].
However, a question could arise with respect to the ability of
most mini-states to carry out certain economic obligations. Mini-states
may be particularly unable to carry out economic sanctions, for example,
especially if these are voted against states upon whom the mini-states are
dependent, economically or administratively. 6 Similarly, the financial
expenditures a U.N. member is called upon to make may pose severe
challenges to the economic resources of many small states. These ex-
penditures include not only the minimum annual dues which small
states are obliged to pay, but also the expense of maintaining a diplo-
matic mission in New York throughout regular and special General
Assembly sessions, participating in the work of U.N. bodies, and attend-
ing U.N. conferences.
In addition, the concept of full membership and the voting power
that flows from it would seem to imply an obligation to be fully informed
15 Presumably, the obligations relating to the maintenance of peace and security
[i.e. Articles 2(5), 43, 45, 48 and 49] encompass the moderating notion of "to
the best of one's ability."
16 Blair, supra, n. 9, at 26. Again, however, this dependence or inability to
carry out economic sanctions may be thought of as a matter of degree. Large
states, on occasion, have also had difficulty carrying out economic sanctions voted
by the U.N.
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and to participate fully on the broad range of matters before the United
Nations. In fact, even today this imposes an exacting burden on all but
the largest delegations. Among smaller delegations it is necessary to
concentrate the efforts of available skilled personnel on those matters of
highest priority or of particular interest.' As the U.N. grows, the
problem of selection becomes greater. Absenteeism is already an ob-
servable feature of General Assembly life and the expectation is that it
will increase. That the strain on the limited number of trained personnel
from mini-states will be a serious one can thus be projected from the
experience of existing small member states. What is not so clear, how-
ever, is how to define the point at which limitations of size or resources
impair the ability of a state to function effectively as a full member or,
for that matter, whether such a point exists.
One approach to measuring a state's ability to meet Charter
obligations is to consider economic indicia, such as per capita income,
government revenue and exports, which fairly reflect national economic
accomplishment. 8 However, the validity and reliability of statistics
pertaining to small territories are doubtful, because of inadequacies in
record-keeping, the difficulty of obtaining information and numerous
other factors. Moreover, any statistical test which emphasizes bigness
might unduly tend to encourage political realignments, federations and
other amalgamations. Finally, a prominent study concludes that the
imposition of even minimum economic requirements could prove em-
barrassing to some existing member states. 9
This is not to say that such an approach is bound to be unsuccessful.
Indeed, especially if it is combined with a method of fairly accounting
for abilities which are not measurable in statistical terms, a members'
agreement establishing specific standards of, "ability" for the purpose
of Article 4 ( 1 ) might be generally acceptable. In any event, examination
of the "ability" question is something the Security Council's Committee
on the Admission of New Members, for example, might usefully under-
take."0
17 See infra n. 30 and accompanying text.
18 The United Nations Committee on Contributions considers such factors in
determining members' assessments. See Blair, supra n. 9, at 30.
19 Id. at 27-31. However, this embarrassment might be overcome by permitting
an applicant to show that it meets some combination of the criteria rather than
all of them. Similarly, the statistical criteria might be fixed in terms of the sta-
tistics of members, rather than in absolute numbers.
20 Although the Committee on the Admission of New Members has not met
for some time, and when it did meet it considered specific applications, there
would appear to be no bar to its meeting to discuss the problem generally. Es-
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Benefits Available to Non-Members
The Charter affords certain benefits to non-members. By virtue
of Article 32, non-member states must be invited to participate in
Security Council discussions of disputes to which they are a party.
The Council, under Rule 39 of its provisional rules of procedure, also
extends invitations to "persons whom it considers competent for the
purpose, to supply it with information or to give other assistance in
examining matters within its competence."
Under Article 50 of the Charter, a non-member that "finds itself
confronted with special economic problems" as a result of a U.N.
security action may "consult the Security Council with regard to a
solution of those problems."
Article 35(2) of the Charter permits a non-member to bring any
dispute to which it is a party to the attention of the Security Council or
the General Assembly, if it accepts in advance the obligations of the
Charter regulating the pacific settlement of disputes. The rules of pro-
cedure of the General Assembly (Rule 13h) and the Security Council
(Rules 6 and 7) both provide for non-member states to place items on
the respective provisional agendas.
Like the Security Council, the General Assembly hears representa-
tives of non-members states, usually in committee and subcommittee
discussions of interest to them. Most, but by no means all, invitations
to participate have been extended in response to a request from a non-
member. The General Assembly's Committee on the Situation with
Regard to Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Inde-
pendence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, the so-called "Committee
of 24," hears petitioners regarding affairs in non-self-governing terri-
tories, sometimes visiting the territories, other times inviting officials
and unofficial representatives to United Nations Headquarters to meet
delegates informally and to consult with Secretariat officials. On oc-
casion, these representatives have participated more directly by being
included in delegations of member states, usually with assignment to
the Fourth Committee (Trust and Non-Self-Governing Territories).
This access would not be open to representatives of independent terri-
tories, however.
Non-members may also become members or associated members
of specialized agencies and thereby participate in the proceedings of
tablishing "ability" criteria in the context of a general review of the problem is
appealing, among other reasons, because it avoids the appearance of determining
whether a particular country is able to meet the obligations of membership.
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organizations such as the United Nations Industrial Development Orga-
nization or the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development,
and be eligible for assistance from the United Nations Development
Program. 1 Such membership also enables states to be invited to accede
to multilateral treaties concluded under the aegis of the U.N. and to
be invited to conferences convened by the U.N. In addition, non-member
states may be invited to participate in the proceedings of the Economic
and Social Council or the Trusteeship Council, as well as the regional
economic commissions, and may become parties to the Statute of the
International Court of Justice.
Observers. At present, the only available status between full
membership and non-membership is that of "observer", an institution
which rests purely on practice and which has not been set on any firm
legal basis.
The Charter does not mention observers. Switzerland was the first
nation to send a permanent observer to New York, eschewing full
membership for fear of compromising its neutrality. The Federal Re-
public of Germany, the Republic of Korea, the Republic of Vietnam,
Monaco and Vatican City are the only others with observers in New
York at this time. 2 In the past, several countries caught in Cold War
membership disputes had the status of observer and used such status
to promote their membership applications-as a "bridge" to member-
ship. Observership, to many, continues to connote the Cold War.
The procedure for sending an observer is relatively uncomplicated.
A state notifies the Secretary-General that an observer (usually that
country's ambassador to the United States) has been appointed. If the
state is considered acceptable, the Secretary-General "acknowledges"
the correspondence.
Acceptability has become a matter of meeting at least two unofficial
criteria: (1) recognition by a majority of U.N. members; and (2)
membership in a U.N. sub-organ or specialized agency. These are
21 The membership of the Universal Postal Union (UPU), for example, in-
cludes such U.N. non-member states as the Republic of Korea, the Republic of
Vietnam, Liechtenstein, Monaco, San Marino, and the Holy See. Monaco is
also a member of UNESCO, the World Health Organization (WHO), the Inter-
national Atomic Energy Agency, and the International Telecommunications Union.
The Republic of Korea is a member of UNESCO, WHO, and the International
Civil Aviation Organization, in addition to UPU. Western Samoa is a member
of WHO and the U.N. Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East. The
number of such examples runs high.
22 Some of these also have established observer missions at the U.N. Office at
Geneva.
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based on the practice of Secretaries-General Trygve Lie and Dag
Hammarskjold and stem from their view that acknowledgment by the
Secretary-General might be thought to imply status and the Secretary-
General should not accord status to an entity unless it is generally
recognized. Membership in a specialized agency is considered evidence
of general recognition. A third qualification might be said to flow from
the ambiguity of the legal status of observers. Because they are not
officially part of the U.N. system, they are not covered by the Head-
quarters Agreement between the U.N. and the United States nor the
U.N. Convention on Privileges and Immunities. Consequently, physical
access to U.N. Headquarters depends upon United States permission,
particularly since the United States Government need not issue visas
to personnel from non-member countries whose regimes are not recog-
nized by the United States.2" It is, however, considered extremely un-
likely that any entity meeting the two initial criteria would experience
difficulty on this count.
Observers get few formal rights. Passes to sessions, preference in
seating, copies of documents, access to corridors and lounges, and in-
vitations to some social functions come with the post.' It is difficult
to measure the advantages in prestige, access to information and cross-
currents of opinion, and other intangible benefits that accrue to states
with permanent observers. As with so many human activities, the
benefits usually bear a correlation to the efforts exerted. 5 It is note-
worthy that the Secretary-General has suggested that observer status
be made available to small states wishing such status.
Alternative Affiliations
Several alternative approaches to resolving the U.N.'s mini-state
problem have been advanced. These may usefully be grouped into three
categories: (1) extending and formalizing the status of permanent ob-
servers, (2) expanding the concept of membership, and (3) creating a
special intermediate status between observers and full members.
Extending and formalizing observership. The Secretary-General,
as noted above, has suggested that consideration be given to amending
the Charter or in some other way formally outlining the status of ob-
servers. It might be useful to add to the present status limited rights
23 Unless they fall within the categories of reasons mentioned in Section 11
of the Headquarters Agreement.
24 Id. See also Blair, supra n. 9, at 41.
25 The Federal Republic of Germany, for example, maintains an active office
and in many respects is as influential and well-informed as many members.
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to participate in committee and commission affairs, while withholding
such rights as the right to vote and to hold office.
Observership status might also be made available to observer
commissions which would represent mini-states. Professor Roger Fisher,
of Harvard Law School, has suggested that the U.N. establish a new
concept of an independent self-governing territory associated with the
United Nations. As a practical matter, suggests Professor Fisher (who
also serves as legal adviser to the provisional government of the island
of Anguilla), all that micro-states may really need at the U.N. is some
place, some office, where an official or a letter from a micro-state would
be received. "It should not be difficult," he has written, "to provide the
micro-state non-member with enough facilities to enable it to contribute
to the extent of its abilities, to the work of the United Nations." 26
Weighing against any extension of the status of observers is the
historical association of observership with Cold War maneuvers and
the lingering implication, perhaps in part because of the word "observer,"
that an observer is an outsider looking in, rather than a part of the
Organization.
Expanding the concept of membership. There appear to be three
distinguishable suggestions for expanding the existing concept of mem-
bership.
The first of these, joint or consolidated membership, is said to have
the advantage of enabling mini-states, by sharing the work and the
cost, to cover the full range of United Nations activities. Such an
arrangement, it is argued, would avoid or at least minimize the ex-
pansion of members, and votes, that separate membership entails.
The Charter, as noted, limits membership to "states," but does
not specify whether this refers only to states acting individually. Re-
portedly, four European mini-states once considered the possibility of
a joint application to the United Nations, but the idea came to
nothing." However, neither U.N. practice 28 nor a reading of the Char-
26 Fisher, Participation of Micro-States in International Affairs, paper pre-
sented at the Annual Meeting of The American Society of International Law,
April 26, 1968 (preliminary draft), at 10.
27 Blair, supra n. 9, at 59.
2
1 See Blair, id., points out that when Egypt and Syria became the United Arab
Republic, and when Tanganyika and Zanzibar became Tanzania, a precedent of
sorts was set for consolidated membership. In each of these two instances, how-
ever, the consolidation of the states was not directed to a single diplomatic func-
tion, such as membership in the U.N., but was rather the merger of two sepa-
rate legal entities into a new legal entity with the old entities disappearing in
the process.
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ter 29 encourages the belief that joint or consolidated membership is con-
templated in the present Charter. Notwithstanding the necessity of a Char-
ter amendment, if indeed such would be necessary, the idea of permitting
joint membership does accord with some recent thinking on the subject
of membership in international organizations. The proposed Caribbean
Development Bank Charter, it is understood, contains provision for
joint membership by some of the very small islands in the region.
A second approach involving a broadening of the concept of mem-
bership is a variant of the observership commission idea discussed above,
the principal difference being that the commission would have the status
of a full member of the United Nations.
A third suggestion which would seem to involve expanding the
present notion of membership is to permit membership limited in dura-
tion or area of participation. The premise behind this approach is that
the interest of extremely small states in matters before the U.N. is apt
to be concentrated on questions whose scope and resolution is rela-
tively limited. On an informal basis, several small member states
currently restrict their efforts to matters of particular concern to them.3"
However, to date there have been no known formulas put forth for
establishing formally the concept of membership limited in duration or
subject matter. In large measure, of course, membership in one or more
specialized agencies answers this need.
Creating an intermediate status. It has been suggested that the
U.N. consider creating an intermediate status-less than full member-
ship yet different from observership. Various international organiza-
tions have done likewise.
29 Altogether, the word "state" is used in its singular and plural forms thirty-one
times in the Charter. See Cohen, supra n. 7, at 1129 (amendments to the Charter
subsequent to the publication of the cited article have not involved the word
"state"). It is instructive to note that only once does the use of the term seem to
imply joint action, that instance being in Article 81 which provides that the
administering authority under a trusteeship agreement "may be one or more
states or the Organization itself." In general, however, the Charter does not
encourage the belief that it contemplates joint or consolidated membership. See
especially Articles 4(2), 32, 35(2), 50 and 93(2), in which the modifying words
"a", "an", and "any" are used with reference to states members of the U.N.
30 The recent activities of Malta, for example, afford a leading example of how
effective this specialization may be. Ambassador Arvid Pardo of Malta has con-
centrated his efforts upon the problems of the exploration and exploitation of
the seabed and ocean floor with the result that he has emerged as one of the
leading figures in the U.N.'s consideration of the subject. Indeed, Ambassador
Pardo's contribution gives one pause in that it indicates that the complete exclu-
sion of very small states could deprive the U.N. of creative intellects which are
always scarce and which can turn up in the smallest places.
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The League of Nations, with specific reference to small independent
states, considered three forms of intermediate association: independent
representation without a vote, representation through a member of the
League, and limited participation. 1 The League committee dealing
with the subject apparently feared that full representation without a vote
would prolong League debates, even on questions in which the direct
interests of small states were not involved. The idea of representation
through a member of the League 32 was rejected as a possible source of
political disputes "and as potentially hurtful to the susceptibilities of
sovereign states." 3' The committee preferred a form of associated mem-
bership by which very small states would
enjoy all the privileges of ordinary members . . . limited ex-
clusively to cases in which their own interests were involved.
Their 'association' would be restricted to taking part in debates
or in votes to the extent that a majority of the Assembly might
decide that the national interests of these states were involved
therein.34
However, the committee also felt that limited participation would give
rise to "great difficulties . . . in defining the status of the state con-
cerned and the definition of its own particular interests." 3" It thus
decided to leave the matter unresolved for the time being. 6
The U.N.'s own economic commissions for Asia and the Far East,
Latin America, and Africa offer associate membership (without voting
or office holding rights) to dependent territories sponsored by their
administering powers. In one form or another, such an associated
status is also available in many other international organizations. What
this status usually accords, in practice, is the right to attend a broad
range of meetings and to participate in discussions, plus those rights
which are available to permanent observers. Customarily, the right to
vote is either denied or circumscribed, as is the right to hold office.
There is thus ample precedent in international organizational
31 See the Report of the Special Committee on "The Position of Small States"
to the Second Assembly of the League. League of Nations, Records of the
Second Assembly, Plenary Meetings, pp. 685-88. The Special Committee was set
up after soundings by San Marino and Monaco, as well as by Lichtenstein whose
application for full membership had been rejected on the basis of her size. See
Blair, supra n. 9, at 49-50.
32 Switzerland had suggested that she might represent the interests of Liech-
tenstein. See Blair, supra n. 9, at 49.
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practice for the U.N. to create some sort of associated status to meet
the needs of small states. Such status would involve a limited but direct
form of participation in the work of the Organization that did not carry
with it either the full rights or the full obligations of membership. It
might include all or some of the following rights: accrediting of repre-
sentatives to the U.N.; full participation in the General Assembly and
its suborgans, including the right to speak and make proposals, but
without the rights to vote; 31 competence to propose items for inclusion
in the General Assembly's agenda; right to receive on a regular basis
U.N. documentation relevant to the state's participation; eligibility for
U.N. technical assistance; and even, perhaps, the right to hold office
in the General Assembly or its suborgans.
Associated states could be required to make some declaration of
their willingness to abide by the principles of the Charter, to commit
themselves, in other words, to the Charter's legal regime. They could
also be obliged to make limited financial contributions to the U.N. that
reflected the added costs to the Organization due to their participation.
To be sure, there might be some risks. The new status could be
so attractive that the Organization would be flooded with applications
for associated status, with the result being an undesirable strain upon
the Organization's already limited resources. Moreover, permanent
members of the Security Council presently have a veto power over
Security Council decisions regarding new members. The attractiveness
of an associated status which does not require Security Council approval
of applicants would have to be considered in that light. 8 There is,
further, a possible risk that associated status would make many of the
benefits of membership too readily available without countervailing
obligations, thus encouraging irresponsibility.
It would be necessary to determine whether such associated status
should be created by action of the General Assembly (perhaps in con-
cert with the Security Council) or by Charter amendment. Either
approach seems feasible from the legal point of view. Considering the
importance of the issues and the desirability of the most firm legal
foundation for the new status, Charter amendment might be preferable.
However, this may be unnecessarily cumbersome and time consum-
ing. Whatever the route selected, there would be value in subjecting
applicants for associated status to a procedure similar to that required
37 See Blair, supra, n. 9, at 52.
38 Selective participation in areas of the U.N.'s work of special interest to
small states might, however, be a likely direction for them to take.
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of applicants for full membership under Article 4(2)."9 The suspension
and restoration rules of Article 5 and expulsion rules of Article 6 would
also seem to be logically applicable to associated states.40
Conclusion
The alternatives discussed in this report represent steps in the
direction of universality for the United Nations Organization. Their
purpose is to enable mini-states to enjoy the benefits of the Organization
without thereby overburdening it or lowering the prestige of member-
ship in it. Our purpose here is not to advocate one or another of the
possible alternatives. Rather, it is to bring attention to the problem and
thereby encourage further consideration by the American legal com-
munity and general public.
ROBERT I. STARR, Chairman
EDWARD GORDON, Rapporteur
WALLACE J. BAKER, SR.
ROBERT ROSENSTOCK t
39 Thus, for example, a regime not presently recognized by the United States
(such as East Germany) could conceivably seek and obtain associated status.
However, if associated status were to evolve as a special category for mini-states,
unfriendly regimes of larger countries might be disciplined to seek such status.
If they did, moreover, they would presumably still have to obtain the approval
of the General Assembly.
40 "Associated states", as such, are not contemplated in the U.N. Headquarters
Agreement or the International Organizations Immunity Act, which would govern
on questions of diplomatic privileges, exemptions and immunities. Under Sec-
tion 15(1) of the Headquarters Agreement, for example, "every person designated
by a Member [of the U.N] as the principal resident representative to the United
Nations of such Member or as a resident representative with the rank of ambas-
sador or minister plenipotentiary" is entitled to diplomatic privileges and immuni-
ties. Presumably, the use of the upper case "M" in "Member" would not seem
to encompass associated states. However, Section 11(5) of the Headquarters
Agreement probably provides a sufficient legal basis for ensuring the transit to
and from the headquarters district by representatives of associated states, who
could be viewed as having been "invited on official business." Moreover, Sec-
tion 20 of the Agreement anticipates the possibility of supplemental agreements
between the Secretary-General of the U.N. and appropriate U.S. authorities; if
thought necessary, this avenue of securing diplomatic privileges and immunities
for representatives of associated states is also open. Suitable ad hoc arrange-
ments might even be worked out without modification of or supplemental agree-
ments to the existing body of applicable law. Thus, an associated state having
diplomatic relations with the United States might simply have its Washington
representative also serve it in New York.
t The views presented here reflect the personal views of the members of the
Subcommittee, and do not necessarily correspond to the views of any agency of
government.
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Separate Views of Wallace J. Baker
The Doctrine of Universality should govern the admission of any
states described as micro-states into full membership in the United
Nations. Their admission as full members with voting privileges should
not be limited by geographical size, number of population, economic
resources or length of time within which they have achieved statehood.
The potential number of such states remains comparatively small.
The advantage of admitting them to full membership in the
United Nations under the basic Doctrine of Universality outweighs
every possible disadvantage that might be brought about by their ad-
mission. To relegate them to membership in various classes less than
full membership rebuts the Doctrine of Universality and gives rise to
a minority group of second and lower class states.
Placing such states in Associate Membership, or making them
observers, weakens, not strengthens, the United Nations and subverts
the natural impulses of such states to grow and develop and assume
international responsibilities. Such a patronizing attitude of the larger
nations, induced more by fear than by a regard for the welfare of such
new states, lowers the international stature and dignity that the United
Nations now possesses.
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